The rollout of the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) a year ago introduced a new public good to humanity. This Chinese initiative has driven home a clear message that all nations have the right to choose their own development paths in their pursuit of modernization, which is not necessarily synonymous with Westernization, as demonstrated by China’s example.

The inspirational success of China in eradicating extreme poverty 10 years ahead of the target deadline set by the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda has debunked the myth that Westernization is the only route to modernization.

Given contemporary geopolitics, which is evolving into a multipolar world, the main takeaway of the GCI focuses on the dire need for self-confidence building, notably in the Global South. This self-confidence is essential before the emerging economies can unshackle themselves from the cultural subjugation imposed by their former Western colonial masters.

This is no Cold War parlance?but a reality particularly relevant in the Global South, where young nations that declared independence after World War II are struggling to regain their cultural confidence and, thus, their economic sovereignty. While their economic resources remain largely in the grip of multinationals acting as proxies for their former colonial rulers, the lingering lack of cultural confidence after prolonged colonial rule allows the insidious force of cultural subordination to harden the myth that modernization must equate to Westernization. This situation provides a convenient pretext for these colonial proxies to plunder the wealth of these nations, which is a widespread practice across the developing world, especially in Africa.

In retrospect, this myth largely stems from the pervasive Western-centric narrative that claims only Western-style democracy can deliver economic development, with the West’s supposed unrivaled technological prowess as the means. This narrative dominated much of the globe for decades until China’s rise as an economic powerhouse with its reform and opening-up.

Veering from conventional Western dictates, China’s success provides an alternative model for the developing world, which has been struggling with the Western example with little or no success for decades. Alongside this, the failure of the Washington Consensus to lift any of them out of the economic doldrums represents another setback, alienating the U.S.-led West from the Global South.

Conversely, the rapid speed of China’s technological advancement and economic rise have both catapulted the nation to an enviable position, threatening the U.S. hegemonic primacy in the eyes of their paranoid politicians.

Having been obsessed with the anguish of being displaced as the unipolar global leader, Washington’s paranoia toward Beijing has grown indiscriminately as the latter assumes a greater role and responsibility in global governance.

The successive rollouts of Chinese public goods, ranging from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the three global Initiatives, were immediately labeled as a Trojan horse designed to export the Chinese political system and model abroad. Ideological differences are conveniently scapegoated as the main cause of concern for the purported security risks in the West. This is further emphasized by repeating the old allegations that China is attempting to change the “rules-based order.”

However, in reality, the world is not divided along the same old ideological lines as in the Cold War. Instead, the face-off between the Westphalian Order and the Liberal International Order represents the prevailing global dynamics.

The Westphalian order, despite being the bedrock of the contemporary international system, is constantly challenged by countries seeking to pursue their interests and agendas through their might.

It is grounded in the norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, self-determination, non-discrimination and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, most of which are generally consistent with the aspirations of the non-Western world. These may coincide with Chinese preferences, but they are certainly not of their making.

On the other hand, the Liberal International Order is dominated and perpetuated by Western-preferred norms, such as the so-called cooperative security, free markets, and Western-style democracy, many of which became prevalent after WWII. However, it has never achieved global consensus.

Yet, equipped with vast colonial influence and superior military might, the Liberal International Order has dominated global governance and challenged the legitimacy of the Westphalian order for over seven decades since WWII.

In this context, China’s global initiatives, including the GCI, calling for an egalitarian and inclusive order in pursuit of just and coherent global governance, are a corrective bid to reinstate the sagging Westphalian order for the benefit of the international community.

Labeling the GCI with an ideology tag of purportedly attempting to change the existing “rules-based order,” is nothing but hegemonic intimidation, masking the real intention of perpetuating Western primacy.

After all, the so-called “rules-based order,” or the Liberal International Order, is not set in stone. It is merely a post-WWII construct designed to serve the interests of the Western victors under the guise of providing global governance, while vast swathes of Asia, Africa, and Latin America remained colonized by them.

When this order can no longer meet the evolving needs and aspirations of the newly independent states, particularly those from the Global South, a call for resetting the order is a natural response. This must occur alongside widespread social awareness and cultural confidence, free from any mental subordination. Only then can an environment conducive to a nation’s modernization and development be established.

In this respect, the GCI undoubtedly serves as a potent enabler, which is of no less significance than both the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI).

Ong Tee Keat is president of the Belt and Road Initiative Caucus for Asia Pacific (BRICAP).