On August 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump met in Anchorage, Alaska, the U.S. Their meeting was the first face-to-face engagement between the top leaders of the two major powers since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022. Although the talks yielded no dramatic breakthroughs, they sent a clear signal from both sides: A deadlock in a contest calls for a strategic adjustment.

Western critics have denounced the meeting above all for Washington’s willingness, in the absence of its NATO allies, to treat Ukrainian territory as a bargaining chip in exchange for so-called peace. To them, this amounted to a concession to Moscow. As a Chinese proverb aptly puts it, “whoever tied the bell on the tiger’s neck must untie it.” In this geopolitical struggle, the real opponents are the U.S. and Russia, and only they have the standing to sit at the negotiating table.

By almost any measure, the U.S. has emerged as the chief beneficiary of the conflict. Washington has seized the global moral high ground, isolating its long-standing geopolitical rival Russia, pressuring European nations to cut economic ties with Moscow, and expanding its own exports of energy and agricultural products. According to the latest Trends in International Arms Transfers 2024 report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on March 10, U.S. arms exports were 21 percent higher in the 2020-24 period than in the previous 2015-19 period, lifting its share of the global market from 35 percent to 43 percent—nearly equal to the combined total of the next eight exporters. Over the past five years, the U.S. has delivered arms to 107 countries and regions, with exports to Europe soaring by 233 percent, raising Europe’s share of U.S. arms exports from 13 percent to 35 percent. Ukraine became the world’s largest arms importer in 2020-24, with volumes nearly 100 times higher than in 2015-19—an increase of 9,627 percent. Yet 71 percent of the weapons supplied by Washington were drawn from its existing stockpiles of second-hand equipment.According to a November 2023 report by The Washington Post, at that time, nearly 90 percent of the U.S. congressional-approved aid to Ukraine remained in the U.S., and there were 117 production lines in at least 71 cities across 31 states where American workers were producing major weapons systems for Ukraine.

For Washington, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has functioned as a form of “managed turbulence,” enabling it to secure three objectives: reinforcing NATO’s cohesion, weakening the European Union’s push for strategic autonomy and harvesting economic dividends from Europe. With those aims already achieved, a peace settlement would allow President Trump to stage a “peace show,” fulfill a campaign pledge and even vie for the Nobel Peace Prize. At the same time, with Russia getting holding the upper hand on the battlefield, bringing the conflict to a close in a face-saving manner amounts to a cost-effective bargain for the U.S. as the prevailing power, because a long delay may cause trouble.

As for Russia, what the West may need to reconsider is the assumption that Moscow’s aim in launching the conflict was traditional territorial expansion or regional dominance. The roots of the war lie in the imbalance of Europe’s post-Cold War security order, with five rounds of NATO enlargement planting a time bomb that finally detonated in 2022. Russia today seems to lack both the ambition and the capability to reproduce the conquests and deterrence of the Soviet era. Yet its national pride must not be underestimated. As late U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger cautioned three months into the conflict, if the West lets emotion cloud its judgment and overlooks Russia’s rightful place in Europe’s balance of power, the consequences could be disastrous.

Russia aims to secure a strategic buffer by holding four eastern Ukrainian regions and to deter NATO’s further eastward expansion. It is not only confronting Ukrainian forces but the entire NATO alliance, and merely maintaining the current front lines has proven difficult enough. According to statistics from the independent Russian outlet Mediazona, by May 27, Russian military deaths had exceeded 101,883. Western institutions estimate that the conflict may already have cost Russia nearly $1 trillion in economic losses. Stronger trade with countries such as India and China has helped ease the impact of Western sanctions, yet excessive reliance on a few partners is equally untenable for Moscow. Having reached battlefield goals it considers acceptable, Russia clearly hopes to strike a deal with Washington to end its diplomatic isolation. As President Putin stated at a joint press conference, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a tragedy and a grievous wound, and Russia sincerely wishes to see it brought to an end.

Ukraine and Europe have been the immediate victims of the conflict. Like Russia, Ukraine has its own economic and security aspirations, yet modern history has repeatedly demonstrated that entrusting national revival entirely to external powers is a futile gamble. Strength must come from within, and Ukraine’s attempt to secure development by acting as Washington’s proxy is destined to fail from the outset. Europe, for its part, should have been at the negotiating table rather than on the menu. Regrettably, however, this continent—often portrayed as a key pole in a multipolar world—has been unable to cast off the label of America’s follower. Possessing formidable military and economic strength but lacking the cohesion to forge a true community of interests, Europe has remained a pawn rather than a player in the geopolitical contest.

“China supports all efforts conducive to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, welcomes continued engagement between Russia and the U.S., and encourages steps to improve their relations and advance a political settlement of the Ukraine crisis,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated at a regular press conference on August 18 in response to the presidential summit. From the very outset of the conflict, Beijing has adhered to the principle of the “four musts”: Sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected; Cold War mentality must be abandoned; hostilities must cease; and negotiations must begin. This neutral position, transcending bloc politics, has provided a constructive framework for addressing the crisis.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has already inflicted devastating human and material losses, and it has long been time to bring it to a close. The summit between the Russian and U.S. presidents has opened a window for peace, while the participation of Ukrainian and European leaders highlights the weight all parties attach to resolving the crisis. Still, the path to peace is fraught with difficulty: divergent interests remain deeply intertwined, and core issues such as territorial disputes and security guarantees will demand painstaking negotiation. The Alaska summit—this geopolitical “halftime”—is clearly not the final act in the reshaping of the global order. Our hope is that the conflict will end soon, and that when the whistle sounds for the second half, it signals not renewed military escalation but the collective resolve of nations to uphold peace.